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CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. WHITING AND THE FUTURE OF 
STATE IMMIGRATION LAWS 
INTRODUCTION 
The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”) requires 
employers to verify the legal status of all newly hired employees.1  To 
facilitate compliance with this requirement, the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) created a federal database (“E-
verify”) that employers could use as a means of verification, although the 
IIRIRA provided that “the Attorney General may not require any person or 
other entity to participate” in E-verify.2  In 2007, Arizona enacted legislation 
that required employers to use E-verify to check the immigration status of all 
new-hires.3  When a coalition of employers and immigrant-rights activists sued 
in federal court to block the implementation of the new law, titled the Legal 
Arizona Workers Act (“LAWA”), the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Arizona ruled that the federal statutory language making E-verify voluntary 
did not preempt Arizona from requiring the database’s use.4  The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s decision.5 
By contrast, subsequent decisions in the Third and Tenth Circuits 
concluded that federal law preempted similar laws in Pennsylvania and 
Oklahoma.6  These courts reached their conclusions partly on the grounds that 
requiring the use of E-verify upsets the balance of interests that Congress 
hoped to achieve by making E-verify’s use voluntary.7 
 
 1. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 274A(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 
1324a(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 2. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, §§ 402(a), 403(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-656, 3009-659 to -662.  The IIRIRA provided for 
several pilot programs.  Id.  One of them, called the Basic Pilot in the Act, became known as E-
verify.  Ariz. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1042 (D. Ariz. 2008). 
 3. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-214 (Supp. 2010). 
 4. Ariz. Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1057. 
 5. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 861 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub 
nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). 
 6. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 219 (3d Cir. 2010); Chamber of Commerce v. 
Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 769 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 7. Lozano, 620 F.3d at 210–11; Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 767–68. 
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On June 28, 2010, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Ninth 
Circuit case under the caption Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria.8  On 
December 8, 2010, the Court heard arguments to determine whether the 
voluntary nature of the federal law preempts the obligations imposed by the 
Arizona law.9  On May 26, 2011, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s 
ruling.10 
This Note will explain why, although the Ninth Circuit correctly applied 
existing law in this case, the Supreme Court should have reversed existing 
precedents and secured control of immigration law at the Federal level.  Such 
an outcome would have prevented further impractical immigration restrictions, 
created a more uniform and predictable frame of reference for employers’ 
immigration questions, and enhanced compliance with the law. 
I.  HISTORY 
A. History of the IRCA & IIRIRA 
The impetus for the IRCA stemmed from the enactment of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 (“INA”).11  Before 1965, strict 
controls governed the number of persons allowed to enter the United States 
from Europe and Asia, but few limitations applied to entry from the 
Americas.12  This lack of limits allowed farmers in the western states to 
organize “bracero”13 programs starting in 1917 to bring Latino farm workers 
back and forth across the Mexican border as needed to work in the fields.14  
The 1965 INA imposed a cap of 120,000 persons per annum on migration from 
the Western Hemisphere15 and specified that only ten percent of visas given 
each year should be apportioned to “immigrants who are capable of performing 
specified skilled or unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for 
which a shortage of employable and willing persons exists in the United 
States.”16 
The bracero programs terminated around the time of the INA’s enactment, 
but the programs’ end did not change the fundamental supply-and-demand 
 
 8. 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010), decided sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting 131 S. Ct. 
1968, 1981 (2011). 
 9. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1968 (2011). 
 10. Id. at 1987. 
 11. See Immigration and Nationality (Hart-Cellar) Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 
89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 12. HELENE HAYES, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE UNDOCUMENTED 16 (2001). 
 13. Bracero is Spanish for “one who works with his arms.”  Id. at 18. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 16. 
 16. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, sec. 3, § 203(a)(6), 79 Stat. at 
913. 
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considerations that motivated their initial formation.17  Consequently, large 
numbers of workers who had once participated in the bracero programs began 
to travel in and out of the United States in a covert, undocumented fashion.18  
By 1980, officials estimated the number of undocumented Latino immigrants 
to be somewhere between three and six million, even as the country suffered a 
surge in unemployment during a difficult recession.19  Moreover, those 
immigrants in the United States suffered stereotyping as “welfare cheats” and 
“free-loaders,”20 sparking an increase in anti-immigrant sentiments that 
culminated in Attorney General William French Smith’s 1981 declaration that 
“[w]e have lost control of our borders.”21 
To regain control, the IRCA attempted to turn off the “job magnet” that 
drew migrants in the first place.22  Interest groups from both ends of the 
political spectrum mounted a bipartisan effort to address the immigration 
issue,23 joining groups as disparate as the Daughters of the American 
Revolution and the American Civil Liberties Union to forge what has been 
characterized as “a carefully crafted political compromise which at every level 
balances specifically chosen measures discouraging illegal employment with 
measures to protect those who might be adversely affected.”24  For instance, 
while early drafts of the IRCA provided permanent residency to any 
undocumented worker “who could prove that he had been working in 
perishable agriculture for at least 20 full days” in 1985, the final version that 
was actually passed required ninety days.25  Likewise, the Democratic-
controlled House included a provision in an early draft ending the employer 
sanctions after six and one half years only to have the measure axed by 
Republicans in the Senate.26 
The earliest draft of the bill imposed a one thousand dollar fine per illegal 
worker if the employer had at least four illegal workers on the payroll.27  When 
 
 17. HAYES, supra note 12, at 18. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 19. 
 20. Id. at 21.  It should be noted that this popular perception was not well grounded in data.  
Id. at 38. 
 21. Administration’s Proposals on Immigration and Refugee Policy: Joint Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary and 
Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 6 
(1982) (statement of William French Smith, Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
 22. HAYES, supra note 12, at 47. 
 23. Id. at 41–46. 
 24. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc. v. INS, 913 F.2d 1350, 1366 (9th Cir. 1990); see 
also Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 212 (3d Cir. 2010); Romano L. Mazzoli, 
Immigration Reform: The Path to Passage and Beyond, 14 J. LEGIS. 41, 41 (1987). 
 25. HAYES, supra note 12, at 60. 
 26. Id. at 62. 
 27. Id. at 53. 
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anti-immigration lobbying groups objected that these sanctions were too weak, 
a subsequent draft of the bill called for three thousand dollar fines against 
repeat offenders per illegal worker for even one illegal worker on the payroll.28  
With business interests alarmed that xenophobia might cut into profits and 
Hispanic organizations alarmed that employer sanctions would lead to 
discrimination,29 Congress reached a compromise of two thousand dollars per 
illegal worker for the first offense.30  No fewer than seven failed attempts to 
reach an acceptable balance were required, as various interest groups 
demanded adjustments to this or that provision, before the final IRCA was 
achieved.31  The later IIRIRA required a similar series of congressional 
compromises, illustrating the complex politics of immigration reform.32 
B. History of the LAWA 
While the impetus behind the LAWA included the IRCA and the IIRIRA, 
other demographic and financial trends unique to Arizona influenced the 
debate.  Although economists disagree about the fiscal impact of illegal 
immigration on various levels of government,33 many think that illegal 
immigration’s fiscal impact falls more heavily on border states like Arizona.34  
 
 28. See id. at 54, 55. 
 29. See id. at 56–64 (describing the differing reactions to the employer sanctions provisions 
in the proposed legislation). 
 30. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 274A(e)(4), 
100 Stat. 3359, 3366. 
 31. HAYES, supra note 12, at 53–55. 
 32. See, e.g., Appiah v. INS, 202 F.3d 704, 710 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting the compromise 
involved in the IIRIRA); LARRY EIG & WILLIAM KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97–946 A, 
IMMIGRATION: ADJUSTMENT TO PERMANENT RESIDENCE STATUS UNDER SECTION 245(i) 5 
(1998), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/487.pdf. 
 33. See, e.g., The Budgetary Impact of Current and Proposed Border Security and 
Immigration Policies: Hearing on S. 2611 Before the S. Comm. on the Budget, 109th Cong. 7 
(2006) (statement of Paul R. Cullinan, Chief, Human Resources Cost Estimates Unit of the 
Congressional Budget Office) [hereinafter “Cullinan”] (“[W]hen increases in immigration are 
simulated in the [Social Security Administration’s computer] models, the program’s finances 
generally show improvement . . . .”); GORDON H. HANSON, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
THE ECONOMIC LOGIC OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 23 (2007) (“[W]e cannot say with much 
conviction whether the aggregate impact of immigration on the U.S. economy is positive or 
negative.  What available evidence does suggest is that the total impact is small.”); PANEL ON THE 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF IMMIGRATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 9 (James 
P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997) (“[T]he net fiscal impact of all U.S. immigrant-headed 
households . . . averaged across all native households in the United States . . . [is a burden] on the 
order of $166 to $226 per native household.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Cullinan, supra note 33, at 4 (“CBO’s review of the research on immigration 
found that over the long term, immigration tends to affect federal finances positively and state 
and local finances negatively.”); COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE 
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While this last point is not clearly established,35 popular perceptions that the 
nation suffered from an excess of undocumented immigrants grew throughout 
the 1990s, especially in the border states.36  Meanwhile the federal government 
struck some commentators as being complicit in the entry of undocumented 
immigrants, even though it retained the power to create and enforce 
immigration laws.37  Such perceptions engendered anti-federal resentment in 
Arizona.38 
To counter popular outrage, Arizona legislators invited Professor Kris 
Kobach to help draft legislation that became the LAWA.39  These legislators 
were inspired by Professor Kobach’s writings on the subject of state 
immigration laws.40  Just like the IRCA at the federal level, the LAWA sought 
to reduce illegal immigration to Arizona by preventing undocumented workers 
from obtaining jobs.41  As Governor Napolitano’s LAWA signing statement 
 
PRESIDENT 106–07 (2005) (“[W]hile immigrants do not impose a net higher tax burden at the 
Federal level, natives in states with a heavy concentration of immigrants from Latin America do 
realize an increased overall tax burden.”). 
 35. See, e.g., JUDITH GANS, UDALL CTR. FOR STUDIES IN PUB. POLICY, IMMIGRANTS IN 
ARIZONA: FISCAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS 3 (2008) (“[I]mmigrants in Arizona generated a net 
2004 fiscal contribution of about $940 million toward services such as public safety, libraries, 
road maintenance, and other areas.”). 
 36. See, e.g., MORRISON INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: PERCEPTIONS 
AND REALITIES (2010); Johanna Dunaway et al., Agenda Setting, Public Opinion, and the Issue of 
Immigration Reform, 91 SOC. SCI. Q. 359, 359 (2010); Rita J. Simon & James P. Lynch, A 
Comparative Assessment of Public Opinion Towards Immigrants and Immigration Policy, 33 
INT’L MIGRATION REV. 455, 458–59 (1999). 
 37. See, e.g., Cullinan, supra note 33, at 8 (noting the large flow of illegal immigrants 
despite increases in the number of border control agents); COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra 
note 34, at 93, 114 (suggesting that the federal government needs to do a better job enforcing 
immigration laws and that the IRCA failed to stop illegal immigration, in part, due to the 
burdensome nature of the labor certification checks). 
 38. See, e.g., MORRISON INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, supra note 36. 
 39. Alia Beard Rau, Activist’s Strategy Spurred Ariz. Law, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 31, 2010, 
at A1. 
 40. Professor Kobach is known for scholarly writings encouraging states to take a more 
active role in immigration enforcement and more particularly for his “mirror-image theory,” 
which holds that states are broadly free to enact immigration-related laws so long as they mirror 
exactly the wording of federal immigration laws.  See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule 
of Law: What States Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
459, 465 (2008) (suggesting that a state immigration law must use terms consistent with federal 
law if it is to avoid preemption); see also Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The 
Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 251, 
255–56 (2011). 
 41. See, e.g., JUDITH GANS, UDALL CTR. FOR STUDIES IN PUB. POLICY, ARIZONA’S 
ECONOMY AND THE LEGAL ARIZONA WORKERS ACT 1 (2008). 
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explained, federal foot-dragging left the state feeling obliged to secure its own 
borders.42 
Professor Kobach intentionally drafted the new law to survive a 
preemption challenge.  It deliberately defers to federal law on the question of 
who is legally allowed to work in the United States.43  It obliges employers to 
verify the legal work eligibility of all new hires using the federal E-verify 
database.44  Finally, its enforcement sanctions are limited to the revocation of 
business licenses45 so as to come within the scope of the IRCA’s own savings 
clause, which explicitly “preempt[s] any State or local law imposing civil or 
criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws).”46 
C. Federal Preemption Jurisprudence 
The leading modern case on the intersection of preemption and 
immigration, De Canas v. Bica, involved American farm workers who sued 
farm labor contractors under a California statute that provided a right of 
recovery for those displaced by undocumented immigrant workers.47  The 
California Superior Court dismissed the case, holding that the statute in 
question was an unconstitutional intrusion on the federal power to regulate 
immigration.48  The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that when 
a state enacts a regulation governing the employment of immigrants, it is an 
employment law (an area within the states’ historic police powers)49 and not an 
immigration law (an exclusively federal prerogative).50 
At the time that De Canas was decided, Congress had yet to address the 
employment of undocumented workers in anything more than a cursory 
fashion.51  Consequently, the Court hinted that De Canas might have been 
decided differently if Congress had addressed such matters more directly.52  Of 
course, in the years since De Canas was decided, Congress has crafted 
 
 42. Letter from Janet Napolitano, Governor of Ariz., to Jim Weiers, Speaker of the Ariz. 
House of Representatives (July 2, 2007) [hereinafter Napolitano Letter], available at 
http://www.azsos.gov/public_services/Chapter_Laws/2007/48th_Legislature_1st_Regular_Ses 
sion/CH_279.pdf. 
 43. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-211(11) (Supp. 2010). 
 44. Id. § 23-214. 
 45. Id. § 23-212(F)(1)(d), (F)(2). 
 46. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 47. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 353 (1976). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 356–57. 
 50. Id. at 355–56.  De Canas defines immigration law per se as “a determination of who 
should or should not be admitted into the country.”  Id. at 355. 
 51. Id. at 360. 
 52. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 361 n.9 (“Congress’ failure to enact such general sanctions 
reinforces the inference that . . . Congress believes this problem does not yet require uniform 
national rules . . . .”). 
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legislation specifically regulating the employment of immigrants, namely, the 
IRCA,53 so the remaining applicability of De Canas was unclear54 until the 
Court recently reaffirmed De Canas’s presumption against preemption of state 
laws regulating matters historically within the states’ police powers—such as 
the employment of immigrants.55 
The Court had clarified the law concerning explicit preemption in 
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, which involved a plaintiff who sued a medical device 
manufacturer for defective product design when her pacemaker failed.56  The 
defendant manufacturer argued that the Florida common law liability 
principles that the plaintiffs asserted were preempted by the federal Medical 
Device Amendments of 1976 (“MDA”).57  The Supreme Court disagreed, 
reaffirming that “[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touch-stone in every 
preemption case.  As a result, any understanding of the scope of a pre-emption 
statute must rest primarily on a fair understanding of congressional purpose.”58 
The Court reasoned that when a law touches on an area within the scope of 
the states’ historic police powers, federal law does not supersede unless 
Congress manifests a clear intention to do so.59  Because there was nothing in 
either the statutory text of the MDA60 or its legislative history61 that rebutted 
the presumption against preemption, the Court ruled that the Florida cause of 
action was not preempted by the MDA.62 
In contrast to the explicit federal preemption of state law described above, 
state laws can also be implicitly preempted by either “field” or “conflict” 
preemption.63  “Field preemption” occurs when Congress intends to occupy an 
 
 53. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (“IRCA forcefully 
made combating the employment of illegal aliens central to the policy of immigration law.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 54. See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 864–65 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Hajra I. Malik, Raiding the American Workplace: Federal Preemption and States’ Rights in 
Curbing Unlawful Alien Employment, 39 N.M. L. REV. 577, 580 (2009). 
 55. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1981 (2011). 
 56. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 481 (1996). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 485–86 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59. Id. at 485 (“In all pre-emption cases . . . we start with the assumption that the historic 
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear 
and manifest purpose of Congress.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. 
Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (“[A]n ‘assumption’ of nonpre-emption is not triggered when the 
State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence.”). 
 60. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 487. 
 61. Id. at 490–91. 
 62. Id. at 494. 
 63. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (“[A] federal statute 
implicitly overrides state law either when the scope of a statute indicates that Congress intended 
federal law to occupy a field exclusively, or when state law is in actual conflict with federal law.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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area of law without explicitly claiming as much in any particular statute.64  
“Conflict preemption” occurs when the requirements of federal and state laws 
are such that an individual cannot comply completely with both.65  The law on 
implicit preemption had also developed in the years since De Canas.  In 
particular, the Court has noted that “saving clauses” (like the one in the 
IRCA)66 serve only to prevent explicit preemption, but do not save state 
statutes from implicit preemption where either field or conflict preemption is 
implicated.67 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT: 
CHICANOS POR LA CAUSA, INC. V. NAPOLITANO 
A. The IRCA Does Not Explicitly Preempt the LAWA 
Governor Janet Napolitano signed the LAWA into law on July 2, 2007.68  
On December 9, 2007, a coalition of Arizona business and immigrants’ rights 
activists filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona alleging 
that the LAWA violated the plaintiff’s Due Process rights, violated the 
Separation of Powers doctrine of the Arizona Constitution, and was preempted 
by federal law.69  The district court ruled for the defendants and the same 
coalition of business and immigration interest groups appealed.70 
When confronted with a facial challenge to the LAWA, the Ninth Circuit’s 
first task was to determine whether the LAWA was expressly preempted by the 
IRCA’s preemption provisions.71  The IRCA excludes “licensing and similar 
laws”72 from its preemption scope, so the argument on this point centered on 
whether the LAWA fit within this exception.73  The appellants argued that the 
savings clause should be read narrowly as applying only to particular 
professional licenses (e.g., license to practice law), not business licenses; 
 
 64. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (“When Congress 
intends federal law to ‘occupy the field,’ state law in that area is preempted.”). 
 65. See id. (“[E]ven if Congress has not occupied the field, state law is naturally preempted 
to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute.  We will find preemption where it is impossible 
for a private party to comply with both state and federal law . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 66. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006). 
 67. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (“[S]aving clause[s] [do] 
not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.”). 
 68. Napolitano Letter, supra note 42, at 1. 
 69. Complaint at 3, Ariz. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (D. 
Ariz. 2008) (No. CV07-02496-PHX-NVW). 
 70. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 863 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 71. “The provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal 
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or 
refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 864. 
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otherwise, the exception could easily swallow the rule.74  The question, 
therefore, became whether the exception should be read broadly (in which case 
the LAWA would fit within the exception and be sustained) or narrowly (in 
which case the LAWA would not fit within the exception and would be struck 
down by the IRCA preemption provisions).75 
1. Under De Canas the LAWA Is an Employment Law 
Does the LAWA regulate a matter within the states’ traditional police 
powers or within the historic federal prerogatives?  If the LAWA governs a 
state matter, then per Medtronic, there would be a presumption against 
preemption and the exception should be applied broadly.76  If the LAWA 
governs a federal matter, however, then there would be no presumption77 and 
the exception should be applied narrowly.78  The Ninth Circuit held that, under 
De Canas, the LAWA is an employment law within the scope of the states’ 
police powers, so a presumption against preemption should apply and the 
IRCA exception should be applied broadly.79 
2. De Canas Still Controls, Even in Light of the IRCA 
At this point the court paused to address the argument that De Canas was 
no longer applicable in light of the IRCA.80  The appellants, relying on 
language in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,81 had argued that the 
IRCA made the regulation of undocumented workers “central to the policy of 
immigration law,” thus bringing the issue within a federal domain in which a 
presumption against preemption no longer applied.82  The court, however, 
distinguished Hoffman from the instant case on the grounds that Hoffman 
involved a federal administrative agency rule, not a state law, so Hoffman did 
not really speak to issues of preemption and De Canas still controlled.83 
B. The IIRIRA Does Not Conflict with the LAWA 
Having established that the LAWA was not expressly preempted, the court 
proceeded to conclude that the LAWA was not implicitly preempted under a 
 
 74. Id. at 865. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1996). 
 77. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000). 
 78. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 864. 
 79. Id. at 865. 
 80. Id. at 864–65. 
 81. 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002). 
 82. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 864 (quoting Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 
U.S. at 147) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 83. Id. at 865. 
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conflict preemption theory.84  The appellants had argued that requiring all 
Arizona employers to use E-verify frustrated the congressional intent to keep 
E-verify voluntary.85  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Congress had repeatedly 
expanded the availability of E-verify, suggesting that Congress wished to see 
E-verify used more widely, so a state law requiring its use was not really in 
conflict with congressional intent.86  Moreover, the court reasoned that because 
Congress had explicitly preempted state laws “imposing civil or criminal 
sanctions . . . upon those who employ . . . unauthorized aliens,”87 the fact that it 
had not explicitly preempted laws requiring E-verify’s use should be 
understood to imply that Congress had no objection to such laws.88 
The appellants had also attempted to argue that the revocation of violators’ 
business licenses was a harsher penalty than the monetary fines imposed by the 
IRCA, and that this increased sanction would encourage employers to avoid 
hiring Hispanics for fear of losing a business license for inadvertently hiring an 
undocumented worker.89  Such an outcome would frustrate the delicate balance 
that Congress had intended to strike between immigration enforcement and 
civil rights protections.90  The court rejected this argument as too speculative91 
because a facial challenge to a law on conflict preemption grounds must rest on 
an actual conflict92 and not veer off into speculations about hypothetical 
outcomes.93  The court suggested that if such discriminatory employment 
 
 84. Id. at 866–67. 
 85. Id. at 866. 
 86. Id. at 867 (citing Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-156, 117 Stat. 1944, 1944; Basic Pilot Extension Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-128, § 2, 115 
Stat. 2407, 2407 (2002)).  It is, perhaps, worth noting that the Lozano court takes this exact 
argument and stands it on its head, arguing that “through various expansions of the program, 
Congress has continually required that E-Verify be strictly voluntary for the vast majority of 
employers.”  Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 215 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Department of 
Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 547, 123 Stat. 2142, 2177; 
Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 110-329, § 143, 122 Stat. 3574, 3580 (2008); Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion 
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-156, §§ 2, 3, 117 Stat. 1944, 1944; Basic Pilot Extension Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-128, § 2, 115 Stat. 2407, 2407 (2002)). 
 87. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006). 
 88. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 867. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982) (“The existence of a 
hypothetical or potential conflict is insufficient to warrant the pre-emption of the state statute.”). 
 93. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449–50 (2008) 
(“In determining whether a law is facially invalid, we must be careful not to go beyond the 
statute’s facial requirements and speculate about ‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’ cases.”). 
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outcomes were to emerge, an as-applied challenge could be brought then and 
would not be prejudiced by the holding of the instant case.94 
III.  ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION: 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. WHITING 
The Ninth Circuit rightly applied existing law in reaching its decision in 
Chicanos Por La Causa.  After hearing arguments in the case, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment based on similar existing law.95  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court should have taken this opportunity to change 
the law for the better by reversing Chicanos Por La Causa and overruling De 
Canas.  Such an outcome would have achieved two important goals: (1) 
employers would have had a more uniform and predictable frame of reference 
for their immigration questions, which would enhance compliance with the 
law; and (2) the practical result of preventing state regulation of immigration 
would have been to prevent the economic shocks that will ensue when 
xenophobic state governments enact draconian immigration restrictions.  
Because such restrictions will curtail the necessary flow of immigrants that the 
modern American economy requires to avoid deleterious disruptions, both 
public policy and purely legal considerations militated in favor of the Supreme 
Court overturning De Canas.  The remaining sections of this Note will first 
explain why the Supreme Court’s ruling was the correct application of existing 
law, and then why stare decisis should not have been applied in this case, but 
rather why current precedents should have been overturned. 
A. The Supreme Court Correctly Concluded That the IRCA Does Not 
Expressly Preempt the LAWA 
There were two points at issue in the Supreme Court’s analysis of express 
preemption: (1) whether there is any ambiguity in the IRCA’s term “licensing 
law” such that a court could find the LAWA to be outside the term’s scope;96 
and (2) whether there is support in the legislative intent and history for a 
narrower reading of “licensing law.”97  The Court was correct in its analysis on 
both points. 
The IRCA’s use of the term “licensing law” definitely includes laws like 
the LAWA.  It is well established that when Congress does not define a 
statutory term, the term should be given its ordinary or “dictionary” meaning.98  
As the Ninth Circuit noted,99 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “licensing” as 
 
 94. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 861. 
 95. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1987 (2011). 
 96. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1977–79. 
 97. Id. at 1979–81. 
 98. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994). 
 99. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 865. 
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“[a] governmental body’s process of issuing a license.”100  Arizona law defines 
a “license” as “any agency permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter or 
similar form of authorization that is required by law and that is issued by any 
agency for the purposes of operating a business in this state.”101  As the Court 
noted, this definition tracks almost exactly the federal definition of a “license” 
in the Administrative Procedures Act.102  By enforcing the LAWA through 
suspension of a business license, Arizona brings the LAWA within the plain 
sense of the term “licensing law.”  When a statutory term is not ambiguous, 
courts must give force to the plain meaning,103 so the Court was correct when it 
held that the LAWA was within the scope of the IRCA’s savings clause.104 
Even if the term “licensing law” were ambiguous, the presumption against 
preemption in this case resolves the ambiguity in the LAWA’s favor.  There is 
a presumption against preempting laws concerning the states’ historic police 
powers.105  De Canas makes clear that laws like the LAWA, which regulate the 
employment of undocumented workers, lie within the states’ historic police 
powers.106  The Medtronic presumption against preemption applies whenever 
the states’ historic police powers are implicated.107  Even if federal laws now 
regulate immigrant employment, historically the field belonged to the states, so 
the Medtronic presumption still applies.108  Therefore, any ambiguity in the 
term “licensing law” must be resolved in the LAWA’s favor.  So the Ninth 
Circuit’s final conclusion that the IRCA does not expressly preempt the 
LAWA is certainly correct. 
The appellants also argued that amendments to the Migrant and Seasonal 
Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”) contained in the IRCA indicate 
that Congress intended for the IRCA’s savings clause to allow state licensing 
sanctions only after a federal IRCA adjudication.109  The Court quickly 
disposed of this argument, simply noting the lack of warrant for this conclusion 
in the IRCA text.110 
 
 100. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1005 (9th ed. 2009). 
 101. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-211(9)(a) (Supp. 2010). 
 102. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1978 (2011). 
 103. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 209 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Lamie v. U.S. 
Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)). 
 104. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981. 
 105. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
 106. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356–57 (1976). 
 107. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485. 
 108. See, e.g., Lozano, 620 F.3d at 206–07. 
 109. Whiting, 131 U.S. at 1979. 
 110. Id. 
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B. The Court Was Correct Not to Find the LAWA Preempted for Conflicts 
with Federal Law 
There are two types of implicit preemption: “field” and “conflict.”  The 
appellants did not offer a field preemption theory, so the Court dealt only with 
conflict preemption arguments.  By trying to bring a facial challenge before the 
LAWA was ever implemented, the appellants argued conflict preemption from 
a weak position.  Conflict preemption cannot arise from merely hypothetical 
conflicts.111  Therefore the appellants set themselves up for defeat by bringing 
this case before any actual businesses could be sanctioned under the LAWA.  
The Court could arguably have dismissed this part of the case as not yet ripe, 
without ever reaching the conflict preemption argument.112  Regardless, the 
Court considered two conflict preemption arguments and correctly rejected 
them both. 
The appellants’ broadest conflict argument was that Congress intended the 
federal immigrant-employment scheme to be exclusive, so any state regulation 
of that subject matter would necessarily conflict with congressional intent.113  
More specifically, the appellants contended that an additional layer of state 
penalties on top of the IRCA penalties would upset the congressional balance 
of incentives.114 
The appellants were able to cite many authorities for the proposition that 
state laws conflict with federal law when they specify a penalty scheme that is 
harsher than the federal scheme.115  The Court distinguished all of these cases, 
however, on the grounds that they all concerned matters belonging to the 
federal sphere of regulation, while the regulation of in-state business through 
licensing laws was within the states’ historic police powers.116  Based on that 
distinction and the express provision that the IRCA savings clause made for 
state sanctions through licensing laws, the Court held that additional state 
 
 111. See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982) (“The existence of a 
hypothetical or potential conflict is insufficient to warrant the pre-emption of the state statute.”). 
 112. See, e.g., Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 812 (2003) 
(enunciating the standard for dismissal on ripeness grounds, i.e., “that further factual development 
would significantly advance our ability to deal with the legal issues presented” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 113. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1983. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. (citing Am. Ins. Ass’n. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401, 405–06 (2003) (presidential 
conduct of foreign policy); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373–74 (2000) 
(foreign affairs power); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001) 
(fraud on a federal agency); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 97, 99 (2000) (regulation of 
maritime vessels); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 143–44 (1989) 
(patent law)). 
 116. Id. 
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penalties did not frustrate the IRCA’s intent.117  Moreover, the Court expressed 
skepticism that the state penalties, as actually applied, would distort 
congressional incentives to the extent that the appellants had predicted.118 
The appellants’ narrower conflict argument was more interesting.  The 
IIRIRA made the use of E-verify optional and forbade the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to make its use generally obligatory.119  The appellants 
argued that, by obliging employers to use E-verify, the LAWA conflicted with 
federal intent to make E-verify optional.120  The Court, cleaving strictly to the 
IIRIRA text, noted that only federal officials, not states, are prevented from 
mandating E-verify’s use.121  The appellants also argued that state E-verify 
mandates conflicted with federal intent because increased demand on the E-
verify system would overwhelm its capacity.122  The Court set little store by 
this argument because the federal government claimed that E-verify could 
handle the increased demand and because Congress has repeatedly expanded 
E-verify, indicating a desire to see it more widely used.123 
C. The Law Would Be Clearer and More Consistent if De Canas Were 
Reversed 
Although the Chicanos Por La Causa court reached the correct conclusion 
under then-current law, public policy concerns dictated that the Supreme Court 
should have overturned De Canas by reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision.  
Restrictions on the employment of immigrants are really immigration 
restrictions, not employment restrictions, the holding of De Canas 
notwithstanding.  To hold otherwise is simply to ignore the reality that the 
Supreme Court recognized in Hoffman Plastics—that the IRCA brought the 
regulation of immigrants’ employment into the scope of a broader federal 
scheme to control immigration.124  State immigration laws create unnecessary 
confusion about the scope of federal authority and the standards for multi-state 
business operations. 
Arizona explicitly enacted the LAWA to discourage immigration,125 and 
the employment regulations are just a mechanism to achieve this end.  Arizona 
 
 117. Id. at 1984–85. 
 118. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1984–85. 
 119. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 402(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-656. 
 120. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1986. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002). 
 125. See, e.g., Minutes of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 48th Ariz. Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 
(April 23, 2007) [hereinafter Minutes] (“Senator Huppenthal stated . . . ‘When I go to 
neighborhoods . . . the impact of illegal immigration has caused them to look like they have been 
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and other states are trying to make an end run around the Constitution’s 
commitment of immigration to the federal authority, so it defeats the 
constitutional intent to regard these state laws as employment regulations 
within the historic police powers. 
The United States’ nationally integrated economy needs a single, national 
immigration regime, not fifty conflicting regimes.126  A principal objection 
against the IRCA when it was first proposed was that it would impose 
awkward burdens on American businesses, and Congress responded to these 
objections by deliberately making that regulatory burden as light as 
practical.127  Congress required the President to compile annual reports 
detailing, among other things, the IRCA’s effects on the nation’s economy.128  
Congress wanted to make the verification process easy for employers to 
encourage voluntary compliance.129  The LAWA diminishes such ease of 
application by adding another layer of regulation to which businesses must 
attend. 
Numerous federal courts have repeatedly declared the “paramount” 
importance of the immigration law’s uniformity.130  Congress directed that the 
IRCA’s application be “uniform.”131  This stress on uniformity reflects the fact 
that federal control of immigration benefits the economy by keeping the 
regulatory burden on American businesses to the minimum necessary to 
control illegal immigration.  Arizona courts’ applications of the LAWA are not 
reviewable by the federal courts to ensure that Arizona’s approach to the 
LAWA’s implementation remains in sync with the federal government’s 
implementation of the IRCA.132  Therefore, the uniformity of immigration 
enforcement will be disrupted by the Court’s decision to let the LAWA stand. 
Moreover, the LAWA and laws like it rest in an uneasy tension with 
dormant commerce clause133 jurisprudence.  Arizona clearly regards 
 
hit with a nuclear bomb . . . .  [I]t is just too much.’”); Napolitano Letter, supra note 42, at 3 
(“Because of Congress’ failure to act, states like Arizona have no choice but to take strong action 
to discourage the further flow of illegal immigration through our borders.”). 
 126. Actually, there are municipalities enacting their own immigration-related housing and 
employment codes, so the number of applicable laws could be well more than fifty.  See, e.g., 
Gray v. City of Valley Park, 567 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 127. Collins Food Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 128. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 403, 100 Stat. 
3359, 3441. 
 129. Mazzoli, supra note 24, at 51. 
 130. Chen v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1028, 1033 (9th Cir. 2008); Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 
1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2004); Rosendo-Ramirez v. INS, 32 F.3d 1085, 1091 (7th Cir. 1994); Brea-
Garcia v. INS, 531 F.2d 693, 699 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 131. Immigration Reform and Control Act § 115, 100 Stat. at 3384. 
 132. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 18–19, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. 
Ct. 1968 (2011) (No. 09-115). 
 133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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undocumented immigrants as a public nuisance.134  The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that states may not push nuisances onto other states.135  No 
matter how harsh Arizona’s laws become, undocumented immigrants will still 
try to enter the United States.  Arizona is, in effect, foisting the costs of 
undocumented immigration onto other states in violation of the dormant 
commerce clause. 
It might be argued that other states can deal with this by passing their own 
restrictive laws, but this solution instigates a problematic “arms race” among 
states to impose more restrictive laws on immigration than their neighbors.  
This would upset the balance that Congress sought to strike between the need 
for regulation and the desire to make such regulation as light as practicable.136  
Moreover the federal courts have long recognized a close link between 
immigration and foreign policy,137 so there is reason to worry that such an 
“arms race” could touch off foreign policy difficulties for the United States.  
This solution, therefore, will not solve the dormant commerce clause problem 
without engendering Supremacy Clause138 and Article II problems.139 
Finally, as Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, the LAWA and laws like it 
encourage the sort of racial and ethnic discrimination that the IRCA sought to 
avoid.140  Under the IRCA, employers face the same sanctions for 
discriminating against a documented worker based on race or ethnicity as they 
face for hiring an undocumented worker.141  By contrast, the LAWA imposes a 
potentially very harsh penalty (loss of business license) on employers who hire 
undocumented workers,142 but discrimination against racial or ethnic minority 
 
 134. See, e.g., Minutes, supra note 125. 
 135. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 686 (1980) (“Iowa may not 
shunt off its fair share of the burden of maintaining interstate truck routes, nor may it create 
increased hazards on the highways of neighboring States in order to decrease the hazards on Iowa 
highways.”); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978) (“The New Jersey law 
at issue in this case falls squarely within the area that the Commerce Clause puts off limits to state 
regulation. . . . [because it is an] attempt by one State to isolate itself from a problem common to 
many by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade.”); Edwards v. California, 314 
U.S. 160, 173 (1941) (stating that no limit to the scope of state authority “is more certain than the 
prohibition against attempts on the part of any single State to isolate itself from difficulties 
common to all of them by restraining the transportation of persons and property across its 
borders”). 
 136. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
 137. See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875); Quinchia v. Att’y Gen., 552 
F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[I]mmigration cases often involve complex public and foreign 
policy concerns . . . .”). 
 138. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 139. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 140. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1990 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 141. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (2006), with id. § 1324b(g). 
 142. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212.01(F)(2) (Supp. 2010). 
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job applicants merely opens the employer to civil liability.143  Imposing stiffer 
penalties for hiring an undocumented worker than for ethnic profiling in hiring 
incentivizes the employer to err on the side of discrimination.144  This is an 
undesirable outcome from a public policy perspective. 
D. Economic Considerations Favor De Canas’s Reversal 
Immigration, including illegal immigration, generates a net fiscal gain to 
the U.S. economy, so anti-immigration measures taken by individual states 
have a deleterious impact on the nation’s fiscal health.145  According to a study 
published by the National Academy of Sciences, even poorly educated, low-
skill, undocumented immigrants and their U.S.-born descendants produce a net 
contribution of $109,700 per immigrant to the public treasury over the long 
term.146  Undocumented immigration may even be a net benefit to the states 
that purport to be most burdened by it; the nineteen states with the highest 
inflows of immigrants, the highest percentage of immigrants, and highest 
resident immigrant populations also all had higher than average gross state 
products, per capita personal incomes, per capita disposable incomes, and 
median household incomes.147 
Meanwhile, immigration enforcement is already expensive, and would 
become even more so if states were allowed to force the federal government’s 
hand on the issue.148  Those economists most critical of immigration have 
calculated that low-skill immigrants consume $89.1 billion per year more in 
government benefits than they pay in taxes, in essence costing American 
taxpayers approximately one trillion dollars over ten years.149  Such 
calculations ignore the full effects of immigration, however; by working for 
lower wages, low-skill immigrants make goods and services in the United 
States cheaper than they would otherwise be, thus increasing the buying power 
 
 143. Id. § 41-1463(B)(1). 
 144. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1990 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 145. See, e.g., Walter A. Ewing, The Economics of Necessity: Economic Report of the 
President Underscores the Importance of Immigration, IMMIGR. POL’Y IN FOCUS, May 2005, at 5. 
 146. THE NEW AMERICANS, supra note 33, at 334.  The figures in this report are given in 
1996 dollars, so to calculate the $109,700 figure given above, I used the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics Inflation Calculator, which is available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. 
 147. RICHARD NADLER, AMERICAS MAJORITY FOUNDATION, IMMIGRATION AND THE 
WEALTH OF STATES 5–8 (2008).  Arizona was one of these states. 
 148. See, e.g., RAJEEV GOYLE & DAVID A. JAEGER, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, 
DEPORTING THE UNDOCUMENTED: A COST ASSESSMENT 3 (2005). 
 149. An Examination of Point Systems As A Method For Selecting Immigrants: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int’l Law of H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 112 (2007) (statement of Robert Rector). 
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of a working American’s wages.150  When these effects are considered in 
calculating low-skill immigrants’ net economic impact, even immigration 
skeptics calculate a net cost of only ten billion dollars per year.151  The United 
States already spends more than this each year on border enforcement, so it 
would not be cost effective to increase border enforcement.152  It would, 
therefore, be detrimental to the nation’s fiscal health for states to enact 
measures to discourage immigration or to force the federal government to 
undertake more vigorous enforcement.153 
Moreover, vigorous enforcement of LAWA-like laws would damage the 
economy.  If public authorities actually removed all undocumented workers 
from the workforce, the American economy would suffer a shortfall of nearly 
2,500,000 low-skill workers, resulting in a severe shock to its productive 
capacities.154  While there are enough out-of-work Americans to make up that 
loss, such a solution ignores the mismatch of skills between currently-
employed undocumented workers and currently-unemployed Americans.155  
Additionally, some Americans are unemployed for reasons (mental illness, 
substance abuse, etc.) that would not be resolved by removing undocumented 
immigrants from the workforce. 
Increased immigration enforcement is neither cost effective, nor well 
justified on other policy grounds.  The most common anti-immigration 
arguments have no substantial merit.  As detailed above, over the long term 
undocumented immigrants end up contributing more to the public treasury in 
taxes than they receive in benefits.156  Despite claims that undocumented 
immigrants take jobs from natives,157 economists agree that undocumented 
workers are as likely to create jobs for native workers as they are to take jobs 
from natives.158  Low-skill immigrants have little effect on the labor market 
 
 150. GORDON H. HANSON, THE ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 8–9 (2009); Patricia Cortes, The Effect of Low-Skilled Immigration on U.S. 
Prices: Evidence from CPI Data, 116 J. POL. ECON. 381, 414 (2008). 
 151. HANSON, supra note 150, at 12. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Of course, by the same token, it is detrimental to the nation’s fiscal health for the U.S. 
Congress to enact laws designed to discourage immigration, but the legality of federal laws is not 
presently an issue before the Court.  In any event, the fact that Congress has crafted some poor 
public policies is no reason for states to upset the federal public policy balance by crafting even 
worse ones. 
 154. See DAVID A. JAEGER, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, REPLACING THE 
UNDOCUMENTED WORK FORCE 4 (2006). 
 155. Id. at 4–5. 
 156. THE NEW AMERICANS, supra note 33, at 334. 
 157. Lamar Smith et al., Reclaim 8 Million Jobs, THE DAILY CALLER (Mar. 19, 2010, 12:57 
AM), http://dailycaller.com/2010/03/19/reclaim-8-million-jobs. 
 158. See, e.g., Joseph Altonji & David Card, The Effects of Immigration on the Labor Market 
Outcomes of Less-Skilled Natives, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 
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outcomes for natives.159  While economists have historically disagreed about 
the effects of undocumented immigration on wages of natives, the most recent 
research on the subject indicates that low-skilled immigrants have no effect or 
even a modest positive effect on the wages of natives in a variety of developed 
nations including the United States.160  Despite claims of undocumented 
immigrant criminality,161 undocumented immigrants are less likely than natives 
to commit violent crimes.162  Indeed, heavy immigrant inflows correlate with 
declining crime rates,163 and immigration may even be causing the decline.164 
CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit rightly applied existing law in its Chicanos Por La 
Causa decision.  The facts of this case are substantially similar to those of De 
Canas.  Although Congress has changed immigration law in the years since De 
Canas, the holding is still ostensibly good law.  The presumptions against 
preemption laid down in De Canas and other cases militated against the 
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LAWA’s suppression, so the Ninth Circuit had no choice but to uphold the 
Arizona statute. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court should have taken this chance to change 
the law for the better by reversing the Ninth Circuit.  To leave the LAWA in 
place creates inconsistency in federal law and confusion about the respective 
roles of states and the federal government in immigration and employment 
law.  Leaving the LAWA in place creates multiple levels of de facto 
immigration courts, because actions brought under the LAWA and similar laws 
in other states lie within the jurisdiction of state courts and beyond the review 
of the federal court system.  By allowing the LAWA to stand, the Supreme 
Court has obliged American firms to contend with federal, state, and local 
immigration laws, a complication that runs counter to the light regulatory 
burden that Congress deliberately crafted in the IRCA. 
Leaving the LAWA in place creates incentives for Arizona employers to 
engage in ethnic profiling in hiring, an outcome that the IRCA was intended to 
avoid.  It also creates a curious and undesirable exception to the dormant 
commerce clause prohibition against one state foisting problems onto another. 
Finally, the ruling in favor of the LAWA will have deleterious economic 
effects.  For better or worse, the American economy requires the labor of many 
undocumented immigrants, and successive presidential administrations have 
tacitly (and sometimes explicitly165) admitted as much by assigning 
comparatively few resources to workplace raids and other such employment-
based efforts to enforce immigration laws.166  Therefore, the proliferation of 
LAWA-like laws will create undesirable disruptions in the American labor 
market. 
For all of these reasons, the Supreme Court should have taken this 
opportunity to clarify the balance of power between the federal government 
and the state governments with regard to immigration.  By striking down the 
LAWA, the Court would have eliminated the inconsistencies in federal law 
wrought by De Canas and headed off the economic shocks that a rash of 
LAWA-style laws will engender.  The Court’s holding should have impinged 
as little as necessary on the states’ historic police powers, but should 
nevertheless have made clear that the federal government occupies the field of 
regulations governing immigrant employment, such that that there is no room 
for concurrent state regulations. 
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